Heresy For Beginners
Friday, July 29, 2005
Static vs. Process view of time, revisited
Looking again at my essay, two years on, I see more and more to correct or qualify. On the static view of time I was getting quite desperate to find a decisive argument the day before the deadline. Fortunately for me, William Lane Craig enumerates four in his reponse to the other authors' criticisms. Unfortunately, the following is quite typical of his arguments:The static theory entails perdurantism, the doctrine that objects have
spatiotemporal parts, a view that is metaphysically counterintuitive, is
incompatible with moral accountability and entails the bizarre counterpart
of transworld identity. (William Lane Craig, in God and Time: Four Views, p.180)
I asked a few lecturers about this sentence but none had much more idea than I about its meaning. Hence, I came up with the illustration of the cricket bat. Thinking about it now though, I don't think my illustration takes it any further than saying it's 'the view of common sense' - although it does help me to understand it better. But I think the atemporalist would just view time as the fourth dimension of space and overcome it that way. I still don't agree though.
Thursday, July 28, 2005
God and Time: Biblical Evidence, re-worked
Gen.3:8 They heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in
the cool of the day, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the
presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden. 9 Then the LORD God
called to the man, and said to him, "Where are you?"
Or after Jonah's amazingly successful preaching:
Jonah 3:10 And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil, that he had said that he would do unto them; and he did it not. (I wouldn't normally favour the KJV but, in this case, I think, it best preserves the untamed language)
Are these passages really anthropomorphic or do they reflect the author's understanding of God? I suspect the latter.
In the genre of allegory/fable/metaphor it's easy enough to present God as one with a body walking through the Garden of Eden. (The popular Footsteps does something similar) But surely, if the author of Genesis 3 were a Calvinist it would look quite different. I don't think anyone brought up with the fundamental assumption that God is totally omniscient could portray him/her as one who really doesn't know what's going on around about him/her. Of course, it's possible to say that God was just pretending not to know where Adam and Eve were but that imposes our view onto the text. And if the author was trying to make God understandable to the his/her audience, why confuse them by suggesting that God might not be omniscient if he/she knew that God really is omniscient all along? By the same token, why use the word 'evil' about God's proposed actions if one believes God to be incapable of evil?
But what of the numerous accounts of prophets who seem hear and interact with God. (I'm far too lazy to list them right now) God calls: 'Samuel, Samuel'. Obviously, it takes twice as long to say the same thing twice, you need time. How can God do this without time? Paul Helm suggests that all apparent manifestations of God within the realm of time and space are written-in to the fabric of the universe from eternity. (I read this about two years ago, he probably didn't use such pretentious language - I'm not sure how he explains Jesus) Basically, knowing from eternity all our questions, requests... God's responses are preprogrammed and so it's not true interaction. This seems to make all of history, sacred and secular, into a bit of a pantomime. I can't disprove it but I choose not to believe it.
So, I think the OT writers generally thought of God as one inside time, or at least, it probably never occurred to them that God could stand outside of time - such categories of temporal/atemporal are probaly quite alien to them. God's temporality, nevertheless, seems to be assumed by most of them but I wouldn't use this alone as the basis for my thinking on the subject. The idea of existence without time seems to come later with the Greek influence. Pretty much as I concluded before.
Monday, July 25, 2005
God and Time
This was the first essay of the second year, as I remember. I worked on it for a few weeks and, at the time, was going around the college asking other students and staff what they thought. Most people, with a few exceptions gave the traditional Christian answer, which I found frustrating because I found (and still find) myself at odds with the traditional answer.The essay is a bit weak in places and I might have to reconsider a few things if I were to fully understand Einstein. The lack of any reference to relativity might be one of the essays weaker points although it wasn't really argued that way by anyone I read. Anyway, we can just say I ran out of space because I was already 200 words over the limit.
Footnotes came with it when I cut and pasted the file and I've added the bibliography too.
Glossary (I hope I'm not being patronising now but there really is a lot of jargon around this topic)
Anthropomorphism - attributing human characteristis to non-human beings - in this case God
Hellenist - Greek, of Greece/Greek thought/culture
Temporalist - One who believes that God is inside time
Atemporalist - One who believes that God is outside of time
Septuagint - An early Greek translation of the Old Testament thought to have been used by NT authors
Deuteronomist - Theoretical author(s) of a large section of the OT (Deuteronomy-2 Kings[ish]) with a distinctive theologial view
Cacophony - An ugly disorganised noise
Immutable - Unchanging
Omnipotent - One with no need for viagra, oh, and all powerful
Omniscient - All knowing
Ontologically - by nature, basically, in essence
God and Time – four views.
The Cornish comedian Jethro once joked that he had just purchased a ‘microwave fireplace’. He said that using the device he was able to sit in front of the fire all night in just 20 minutes.[1] The humour of this is rooted in the paradoxical nature of the statement. The church has traditionally upheld something similarly paradoxical by asserting that God lives outside of time in what has been termed, ‘the eternal now’.[2] Is that an eternal instant, or an instant eternity? Can such a paradox be defended? More recently, many Christian thinkers and philosophers have questioned this view and have argued that God is inside time, which in turn raises questions about some of the conventionally accepted attributes of God and the nature of his being.
Biblical Evidence
Boethius defines eternity as “the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one simultaneous whole.”[13] Paul Helm’s primary reason for holding his atemporalist view is on the basis of preserving the fullness of God’s life. If God is in time then his past is irrevocably past and cannot be brought back, “the uniqueness of the present moment is forever lost when that moment becomes past.”[14] Is such a “never passing instant”[15] a preferable and more perfect life than one in time where each unique moment is replaced with another unique moment eternally? It seems that without time God is frozen in a moment and is powerless to change or escape. Grace Jantzen argues, “A living God cannot be static: life implies change and hence temporality.”[16] This, it may be argued, is overly anthropomorphic; God does not need to breathe and he does not have a heartbeat and so change is not necessary for his life. So how is such a God alive? Helm rejects the ideas of Stump and Kretzmann of what eternity is like as incoherent and concludes that it is only possible to say what eternity is not like, for God is incomprehensible to human minds and no analogy can ultimately explain the nature of timeless life.[17] Padgett asserts that such a “changeless being… ‘lives’ only in a very stretched sense of the word”[18] The impoverished nature of a timeless life is perhaps best illustrated by Wolterstorff’s argument that a timeless God’s appreciation of music must be limited to either one chord ringing eternally or all the music that has ever been made squeezed into one endless cacophonic tone.[19] It is hard to imagine such a changeless God having personality.[20]
Most see the static view of time to be a necessary postulate for a timeless God because if the process theory of time is true then God is supporting different life forms at different times and is thus changing.[21] Padgett argues that the process theory of time is persuasive because everyone experiences processes and this is the view of ‘common sense’;[22] it is certainly the easier to believe of the two but this is not a compelling argument. Anthony Kenny asserts:
The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent… on this
view the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity… while I
type these words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.[23]
Moreover, on the static view, something like a cricket bat that is made of wood, and is later burnt is simultaneously part of a living tree, a dead object and also a pile of ashes. The static theory of time demands that matter should be in two or more places and forms at once. This appears to be an indefensible paradox.
Is time part of creation?[24] Presuming creation ex nihilo, either: time began with the big bang or time has no beginning. If time started with the big bang then God must transcend time in the same way that he transcends space as the creator. There are two main objections to the idea that time has no beginning. Firstly, it is often asked, ‘Why did God create the universe when he did?’[25] Craig gets around the problem by suggesting that God was timeless before creation and so choosing a time to start is not an issue. However, Padgett cogently argues that without time there is no possibility of change and so, how could God change to a state of temporality if he was previously timeless?[26] Helm also criticises this view pointing out that timelessness cannot have a temporal relationship to time.[27] Still on the issue of why God created the universe when he did, Ganssle states, “It seems as though any point in the infinite past is as good as any other”.[28] If this is the case then God could not have chosen a better moment in which to begin his creation.
The second objection is related to the Kalam cosmological argument.[29] According to this argument everything that begins to exist has a cause, and an actual infinite cannot exist.[30] Ganssle believes that time cannot have an infinite past so it must have a beginning. However, not many have any problem with the idea that God has no beginning or cause. Padgett tries to escape this problem by proposing a ‘nonfinite’ rather than ‘infinite’ period of time before the first change in God and without change there is no metric for time so in effect no time passed before the first change, it was instead 'pure duration’ or ‘relative timelessness’.[31] Nonetheless, what is the practical difference between ‘infinite’ and ‘nonfinite’? This still involves time without beginning. The simplest way out of this seems to be to take the step that Padgett is unwilling to take, i.e. to say with Isaac Newton that time is a feature of God’s being and thus God has been eternally changing.[32] Otherwise, to assert that a God who changes existed for an indeterminate time without change would suggest that he was dormant for a while. The question of what God was doing before creating the universe is a matter of speculation but it is not necessary to believe that the universe is the sum of his work.
A timeless God is by definition immutable, it is impossible to change without time. A temporal God is necessarily ever changing because he is constantly experiencing the unfolding of history and supporting new life. So what happens to the doctrine of immutability? Since the time of Aquinas theologians have been comfortable with the idea that God’s omnipotence is limited to what is logically possible. For instance, God cannot make a truly square circle or act in a way contrary to his character.[33] Can the doctrine of immutability be qualified in a similar way? Not all change implies becoming any more or less perfect. Neither is it necessary that if God is in time that he is developing in any way nor that he is subject to entropy nor that his character changes in any other way. Wolterstorff looks at biblical evidence concerning immutability and correctly concludes that it does not necessarily imply absolute immutability. He instead argues that God is immutable in resolve rather than that he is ontologically immutable.[34] This seems to be a back-to-front way of dealing with the issue and Helm is quick to point out that if this is the case then God may change his mind and decide to lie.[35] Padgett’s suggestion seems to be more sensible, that God is immutable in that his basic character does not change but that he does different things at different times.[36]
Many argue that a timeless God cannot be omniscient because he cannot know tensed facts or what time is now. However, there does not seem to be much mileage in this when most atemporalists adopt a static view of time in which all times are ontologically the same, from God’s point of view there are no tensed facts. Nonetheless, the atemporalist would argue, this does not mean that God cannot see that the Battle of Bosworth is earlier than the Battle of the Somme in the same way that he can see that Bosworth Field is in a different spatial location to the Somme River. Furthermore, 'now' is relative to one’s own frame of reference; someone in London may say it is midnight and at that same moment someone in Chicago may say it is 6:00pm. Surely, if any fact is relative then God’s view must be the standard of objectivity. Moreover, if someone were to ask God, ‘What time is it now?’ then God, knowing that person’s temporal and spatial location, can say 'For you the time is 7:14am precisely' and this is true for that person but not for God.[37] [Although a timeless God cannot truly respond to anything]
In summary then, when investigating the issue of God and time the Bible gives no absolute answers as some scriptures can be interpreted to fit various views, and others appear to give conflicting evidence. The issue of God’s omniscience similarly does not really get us any closer to an answer, as the temporalist argument that a timeless God cannot be omniscient is really a case of ‘nit picking’ that does not really have any bearing on God’s knowledge. On the other hand the atemporalist’s claim, that a God without complete foreknowledge is not omniscient is equally unfounded, as this requires God to know things that are not so. The main issue in this area is whether a timeless existence is preferable to a temporal one; in my judgement, it is not. It seems that a timeless God is what Padgett terms, “God in a box”.[40] The static theory of time, which is necessary for timelessness, is also incoherent in my view. The doctrine of immutability does not really suffer from this providing it is sensibly interpreted as pertaining to God’s character rather than in absolute terms. Finally, if time is seen as a feature of God’s being then the idea of time having no beginning is no more a problem than the idea of God having no beginning.
[1] Jethro (1995).
[2] Ganssle (2001) p.12.
[3] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p31.
[4] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) pp188-189.
[5] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp 214-215.
[6] Craig, in Ganssle (2001) p 131. (2 Timothy 1:9, Titus 1:2-3, Jude 25)
[7] Ibid.
[8] Proverbs 8:23 in the NIV.
[9] Cranfield C. E. B. (1975) p 25.
[10] Ibid. See also Sanders, (1977) pp552-556.
[11] In his article God Is Everlasting in Peterson et al (1996) pp126-127. Wolterstorff argues this point in agreement with William Kneale but has since changed his mind on the matter.
[12] For example God appears to change his mind in response to Hezekiah’s prayer. 2 Kings 20:1-11.
[13] Boethius, in Peterson et al (1996) p 122.
[14] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p30.
[15] Boethius, cited by Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p36.
[16] Grace Jantzen, cited in Davies (1993) p144.
[17] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p37-38.
[18] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp61-62.
[19] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) p73.
[20] Brian Davies discusses whether God should be seen as an acting person or not and concludes that such vocabulary is anthropomorphic and unbiblical. Davies (1993) pp143-145. However, Genesis tells us that God made humans in his own image, how exactly is this true if God does not have the quality of personhood?
[21] Ganssle (2001) p15.
[22] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp102-104.
[23] Kenny (1979) pp38-39.
[24] Wolterstorff’s argument that time and space are not so alike as it is often claimed because space has no parallel to the process theory of time seems to have some force. Wolterstorff, in Ganssle pp208-209.
[25] Ganssle, (2001) p17.
[26] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp168-169.
[27] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp163-164.
[28] Ibid
[29] Ganssle, (2001) pp17-18.
[30] Peterson, et al. (1998) pp92-95.
[31] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp108-110.
[32] Isaac Newton, The Principia, cited by Craig, in Ganssle (2001) pp115-116.
[33] Peterson et al, (1998) pp71-72.
[34] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) pp191-193.
[35] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p214.
[36] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) p62.
[37] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp41-42.
[38] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p41.
[39] Craig, in Beilby & Eddy, (2001) pp132-135.
[40] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) p61.
Bibliography
Beilby, J. K. & Eddy, P.R., Divine Foreknowledge, Four views, (2001) Paternoster Press, Carlisle.
Cranfield C. E. B., The International Critical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Vol 1, (1975) T.&T. Clark, Edinburgh.
Davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (Second edition), (1993) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ganssle, G. E., (ed), God & Time, Four Views, (2001) IVP, Downers Grove, Illinois.
Jethro., The Jethro Junction, (1995) First Independent Films Limited, England.
Kenny, A., The God of the Philosophers, (1979) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lewis, C. S., Mere Christianity, (1952) Fontana Books, London.
Morris, T. V., Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology, (1991) IVP, Downers Grove, Illinois.
Peterson, M., et al, Philosophy of Religion, Selected Readings, (1996) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Peterson, M., et al, Reason and Religious Belief, Second edition, (1998) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sanders, E. P., Paul and Palestinian Judaism, (1977) SCM Press, London.
Sunday, July 24, 2005
Heresy in the making
Being an attention-seeking narcissist, as I am, I thought maybe I'd publish a few of my better essays here. Firstly, a selection from my degree, then maybe I'll add some as I go with my MA. I'll probably edit them a bit to save myself looking like a complete idiot.Maybe I'll add some shorter posts with less well thought-out ideas as well.
If you're too busy to read any of them, that's okay, if not, comments would be appreciated.