God and Time
This was the first essay of the second year, as I remember. I worked on it for a few weeks and, at the time, was going around the college asking other students and staff what they thought. Most people, with a few exceptions gave the traditional Christian answer, which I found frustrating because I found (and still find) myself at odds with the traditional answer.The essay is a bit weak in places and I might have to reconsider a few things if I were to fully understand Einstein. The lack of any reference to relativity might be one of the essays weaker points although it wasn't really argued that way by anyone I read. Anyway, we can just say I ran out of space because I was already 200 words over the limit.
Footnotes came with it when I cut and pasted the file and I've added the bibliography too.
Glossary (I hope I'm not being patronising now but there really is a lot of jargon around this topic)
Anthropomorphism - attributing human characteristis to non-human beings - in this case God
Hellenist - Greek, of Greece/Greek thought/culture
Temporalist - One who believes that God is inside time
Atemporalist - One who believes that God is outside of time
Septuagint - An early Greek translation of the Old Testament thought to have been used by NT authors
Deuteronomist - Theoretical author(s) of a large section of the OT (Deuteronomy-2 Kings[ish]) with a distinctive theologial view
Cacophony - An ugly disorganised noise
Immutable - Unchanging
Omnipotent - One with no need for viagra, oh, and all powerful
Omniscient - All knowing
Ontologically - by nature, basically, in essence
Read, review and research around the topic of the following title:
God and Time – four views.
God and Time – four views.
Introduction
The Cornish comedian Jethro once joked that he had just purchased a ‘microwave fireplace’. He said that using the device he was able to sit in front of the fire all night in just 20 minutes.[1] The humour of this is rooted in the paradoxical nature of the statement. The church has traditionally upheld something similarly paradoxical by asserting that God lives outside of time in what has been termed, ‘the eternal now’.[2] Is that an eternal instant, or an instant eternity? Can such a paradox be defended? More recently, many Christian thinkers and philosophers have questioned this view and have argued that God is inside time, which in turn raises questions about some of the conventionally accepted attributes of God and the nature of his being.
The Cornish comedian Jethro once joked that he had just purchased a ‘microwave fireplace’. He said that using the device he was able to sit in front of the fire all night in just 20 minutes.[1] The humour of this is rooted in the paradoxical nature of the statement. The church has traditionally upheld something similarly paradoxical by asserting that God lives outside of time in what has been termed, ‘the eternal now’.[2] Is that an eternal instant, or an instant eternity? Can such a paradox be defended? More recently, many Christian thinkers and philosophers have questioned this view and have argued that God is inside time, which in turn raises questions about some of the conventionally accepted attributes of God and the nature of his being.
Biblical Evidence
Paul Helm states, “The language of scripture about God and time is not sufficiently precise so as to provide a definitive resolution of the issue one way or the other.”[3] Nevertheless, Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Lane Craig use scripture to back up their respective views. Wolterstorff points out that there is much material in the Old Testament that depicts God as one who acts in time.[4] Helm argues that such texts should not be taken literally but should rather be understood as anthropomorphisms.[5] William Lane Craig tentatively uses three New Testament verses that all contain words to the effect of ‘before time’ to support his view that God was timeless before creation but is now inside time.[6]
Interestingly, Craig also notes that the Septuagint’s interpretation of Proverbs 8:23 is at variance with extant Hebrew versions.[7] Where standard translations say, “Before the world began”[8] the Septuagint reads, “Before time”. New Testament authors rely heavily on the Septuagint,[9] St. Paul often quotes from it and C Cranfield even suggests that he was as comfortable (if not more so) thinking in Greek as he was in Aramaic.[10] This looks like evidence of Greek influence on the writing of New Testament redactors and therefore, where they say ‘before time’ it would seem better to read ‘before creation’, which may not be the same thing. Temporalists have often asserted that Augustine formulated his eternalist view under the subtle influence of Greek philosophy.[11] Could it be that the influence of Hellenism goes further back than that, back to the Septuagint? It would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for someone to write in the Greek language without being influenced by the pervasive Greek culture.
However, even if any apparent biblical allusions to timelessness are found to be due to Greek influence, that does not mean it is wrong. Furthermore, even if the Greek influence is seen as a negative thing that does not negate the possibility that narratives that represent God in time may simply be anthropomorphic. The Deuteronomist, who appears to assume that God acts in history,[12] could just be describing God, as he understands him to be; in a humanlike way. Whether God is inside time or outside of time was probably not the central issue for biblical authors and their writings most likely reflect the prevailing belief of their social context on the issue. Bearing all this in mind, it seems that the matter should be decided by what is more reasonable rather than by what appears to be more canonical.
What does it mean to be timeless?
Boethius defines eternity as “the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one simultaneous whole.”[13] Paul Helm’s primary reason for holding his atemporalist view is on the basis of preserving the fullness of God’s life. If God is in time then his past is irrevocably past and cannot be brought back, “the uniqueness of the present moment is forever lost when that moment becomes past.”[14] Is such a “never passing instant”[15] a preferable and more perfect life than one in time where each unique moment is replaced with another unique moment eternally? It seems that without time God is frozen in a moment and is powerless to change or escape. Grace Jantzen argues, “A living God cannot be static: life implies change and hence temporality.”[16] This, it may be argued, is overly anthropomorphic; God does not need to breathe and he does not have a heartbeat and so change is not necessary for his life. So how is such a God alive? Helm rejects the ideas of Stump and Kretzmann of what eternity is like as incoherent and concludes that it is only possible to say what eternity is not like, for God is incomprehensible to human minds and no analogy can ultimately explain the nature of timeless life.[17] Padgett asserts that such a “changeless being… ‘lives’ only in a very stretched sense of the word”[18] The impoverished nature of a timeless life is perhaps best illustrated by Wolterstorff’s argument that a timeless God’s appreciation of music must be limited to either one chord ringing eternally or all the music that has ever been made squeezed into one endless cacophonic tone.[19] It is hard to imagine such a changeless God having personality.[20]
Boethius defines eternity as “the complete possession of an endless life enjoyed as one simultaneous whole.”[13] Paul Helm’s primary reason for holding his atemporalist view is on the basis of preserving the fullness of God’s life. If God is in time then his past is irrevocably past and cannot be brought back, “the uniqueness of the present moment is forever lost when that moment becomes past.”[14] Is such a “never passing instant”[15] a preferable and more perfect life than one in time where each unique moment is replaced with another unique moment eternally? It seems that without time God is frozen in a moment and is powerless to change or escape. Grace Jantzen argues, “A living God cannot be static: life implies change and hence temporality.”[16] This, it may be argued, is overly anthropomorphic; God does not need to breathe and he does not have a heartbeat and so change is not necessary for his life. So how is such a God alive? Helm rejects the ideas of Stump and Kretzmann of what eternity is like as incoherent and concludes that it is only possible to say what eternity is not like, for God is incomprehensible to human minds and no analogy can ultimately explain the nature of timeless life.[17] Padgett asserts that such a “changeless being… ‘lives’ only in a very stretched sense of the word”[18] The impoverished nature of a timeless life is perhaps best illustrated by Wolterstorff’s argument that a timeless God’s appreciation of music must be limited to either one chord ringing eternally or all the music that has ever been made squeezed into one endless cacophonic tone.[19] It is hard to imagine such a changeless God having personality.[20]
Static vs. Process view of time
Most see the static view of time to be a necessary postulate for a timeless God because if the process theory of time is true then God is supporting different life forms at different times and is thus changing.[21] Padgett argues that the process theory of time is persuasive because everyone experiences processes and this is the view of ‘common sense’;[22] it is certainly the easier to believe of the two but this is not a compelling argument. Anthony Kenny asserts:
Most see the static view of time to be a necessary postulate for a timeless God because if the process theory of time is true then God is supporting different life forms at different times and is thus changing.[21] Padgett argues that the process theory of time is persuasive because everyone experiences processes and this is the view of ‘common sense’;[22] it is certainly the easier to believe of the two but this is not a compelling argument. Anthony Kenny asserts:
The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent… on this
view the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity… while I
type these words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.[23]
Moreover, on the static view, something like a cricket bat that is made of wood, and is later burnt is simultaneously part of a living tree, a dead object and also a pile of ashes. The static theory of time demands that matter should be in two or more places and forms at once. This appears to be an indefensible paradox.
Time without beginning?
Is time part of creation?[24] Presuming creation ex nihilo, either: time began with the big bang or time has no beginning. If time started with the big bang then God must transcend time in the same way that he transcends space as the creator. There are two main objections to the idea that time has no beginning. Firstly, it is often asked, ‘Why did God create the universe when he did?’[25] Craig gets around the problem by suggesting that God was timeless before creation and so choosing a time to start is not an issue. However, Padgett cogently argues that without time there is no possibility of change and so, how could God change to a state of temporality if he was previously timeless?[26] Helm also criticises this view pointing out that timelessness cannot have a temporal relationship to time.[27] Still on the issue of why God created the universe when he did, Ganssle states, “It seems as though any point in the infinite past is as good as any other”.[28] If this is the case then God could not have chosen a better moment in which to begin his creation.
Is time part of creation?[24] Presuming creation ex nihilo, either: time began with the big bang or time has no beginning. If time started with the big bang then God must transcend time in the same way that he transcends space as the creator. There are two main objections to the idea that time has no beginning. Firstly, it is often asked, ‘Why did God create the universe when he did?’[25] Craig gets around the problem by suggesting that God was timeless before creation and so choosing a time to start is not an issue. However, Padgett cogently argues that without time there is no possibility of change and so, how could God change to a state of temporality if he was previously timeless?[26] Helm also criticises this view pointing out that timelessness cannot have a temporal relationship to time.[27] Still on the issue of why God created the universe when he did, Ganssle states, “It seems as though any point in the infinite past is as good as any other”.[28] If this is the case then God could not have chosen a better moment in which to begin his creation.
The second objection is related to the Kalam cosmological argument.[29] According to this argument everything that begins to exist has a cause, and an actual infinite cannot exist.[30] Ganssle believes that time cannot have an infinite past so it must have a beginning. However, not many have any problem with the idea that God has no beginning or cause. Padgett tries to escape this problem by proposing a ‘nonfinite’ rather than ‘infinite’ period of time before the first change in God and without change there is no metric for time so in effect no time passed before the first change, it was instead 'pure duration’ or ‘relative timelessness’.[31] Nonetheless, what is the practical difference between ‘infinite’ and ‘nonfinite’? This still involves time without beginning. The simplest way out of this seems to be to take the step that Padgett is unwilling to take, i.e. to say with Isaac Newton that time is a feature of God’s being and thus God has been eternally changing.[32] Otherwise, to assert that a God who changes existed for an indeterminate time without change would suggest that he was dormant for a while. The question of what God was doing before creating the universe is a matter of speculation but it is not necessary to believe that the universe is the sum of his work.
What of God's attributes? - Immutability
A timeless God is by definition immutable, it is impossible to change without time. A temporal God is necessarily ever changing because he is constantly experiencing the unfolding of history and supporting new life. So what happens to the doctrine of immutability? Since the time of Aquinas theologians have been comfortable with the idea that God’s omnipotence is limited to what is logically possible. For instance, God cannot make a truly square circle or act in a way contrary to his character.[33] Can the doctrine of immutability be qualified in a similar way? Not all change implies becoming any more or less perfect. Neither is it necessary that if God is in time that he is developing in any way nor that he is subject to entropy nor that his character changes in any other way. Wolterstorff looks at biblical evidence concerning immutability and correctly concludes that it does not necessarily imply absolute immutability. He instead argues that God is immutable in resolve rather than that he is ontologically immutable.[34] This seems to be a back-to-front way of dealing with the issue and Helm is quick to point out that if this is the case then God may change his mind and decide to lie.[35] Padgett’s suggestion seems to be more sensible, that God is immutable in that his basic character does not change but that he does different things at different times.[36]
A timeless God is by definition immutable, it is impossible to change without time. A temporal God is necessarily ever changing because he is constantly experiencing the unfolding of history and supporting new life. So what happens to the doctrine of immutability? Since the time of Aquinas theologians have been comfortable with the idea that God’s omnipotence is limited to what is logically possible. For instance, God cannot make a truly square circle or act in a way contrary to his character.[33] Can the doctrine of immutability be qualified in a similar way? Not all change implies becoming any more or less perfect. Neither is it necessary that if God is in time that he is developing in any way nor that he is subject to entropy nor that his character changes in any other way. Wolterstorff looks at biblical evidence concerning immutability and correctly concludes that it does not necessarily imply absolute immutability. He instead argues that God is immutable in resolve rather than that he is ontologically immutable.[34] This seems to be a back-to-front way of dealing with the issue and Helm is quick to point out that if this is the case then God may change his mind and decide to lie.[35] Padgett’s suggestion seems to be more sensible, that God is immutable in that his basic character does not change but that he does different things at different times.[36]
Omniscience
Many argue that a timeless God cannot be omniscient because he cannot know tensed facts or what time is now. However, there does not seem to be much mileage in this when most atemporalists adopt a static view of time in which all times are ontologically the same, from God’s point of view there are no tensed facts. Nonetheless, the atemporalist would argue, this does not mean that God cannot see that the Battle of Bosworth is earlier than the Battle of the Somme in the same way that he can see that Bosworth Field is in a different spatial location to the Somme River. Furthermore, 'now' is relative to one’s own frame of reference; someone in London may say it is midnight and at that same moment someone in Chicago may say it is 6:00pm. Surely, if any fact is relative then God’s view must be the standard of objectivity. Moreover, if someone were to ask God, ‘What time is it now?’ then God, knowing that person’s temporal and spatial location, can say 'For you the time is 7:14am precisely' and this is true for that person but not for God.[37] [Although a timeless God cannot truly respond to anything]
Many argue that a timeless God cannot be omniscient because he cannot know tensed facts or what time is now. However, there does not seem to be much mileage in this when most atemporalists adopt a static view of time in which all times are ontologically the same, from God’s point of view there are no tensed facts. Nonetheless, the atemporalist would argue, this does not mean that God cannot see that the Battle of Bosworth is earlier than the Battle of the Somme in the same way that he can see that Bosworth Field is in a different spatial location to the Somme River. Furthermore, 'now' is relative to one’s own frame of reference; someone in London may say it is midnight and at that same moment someone in Chicago may say it is 6:00pm. Surely, if any fact is relative then God’s view must be the standard of objectivity. Moreover, if someone were to ask God, ‘What time is it now?’ then God, knowing that person’s temporal and spatial location, can say 'For you the time is 7:14am precisely' and this is true for that person but not for God.[37] [Although a timeless God cannot truly respond to anything]
Helm counters claiming that omniscience is equally a problem for the temporalist. If God is inside time, and he has not determined all events, then he cannot have perfect knowledge of the future.[38] However, if one takes a process view of time then the future does not actually exist yet, and unlike the past never has existed, so it is not reasonable to expect God to know it completely. Nevertheless, God with his complete knowledge of the past and present knows all possible future outcomes and probabilities and this, some would argue, is more impressive than simply knowing about things that have, for all intents and purposes, already happened; Craig describes such knowledge as “mind boggling”.[39] Thus, the issue of omniscience only results in deadlock.
Conclusion
In summary then, when investigating the issue of God and time the Bible gives no absolute answers as some scriptures can be interpreted to fit various views, and others appear to give conflicting evidence. The issue of God’s omniscience similarly does not really get us any closer to an answer, as the temporalist argument that a timeless God cannot be omniscient is really a case of ‘nit picking’ that does not really have any bearing on God’s knowledge. On the other hand the atemporalist’s claim, that a God without complete foreknowledge is not omniscient is equally unfounded, as this requires God to know things that are not so. The main issue in this area is whether a timeless existence is preferable to a temporal one; in my judgement, it is not. It seems that a timeless God is what Padgett terms, “God in a box”.[40] The static theory of time, which is necessary for timelessness, is also incoherent in my view. The doctrine of immutability does not really suffer from this providing it is sensibly interpreted as pertaining to God’s character rather than in absolute terms. Finally, if time is seen as a feature of God’s being then the idea of time having no beginning is no more a problem than the idea of God having no beginning.
In summary then, when investigating the issue of God and time the Bible gives no absolute answers as some scriptures can be interpreted to fit various views, and others appear to give conflicting evidence. The issue of God’s omniscience similarly does not really get us any closer to an answer, as the temporalist argument that a timeless God cannot be omniscient is really a case of ‘nit picking’ that does not really have any bearing on God’s knowledge. On the other hand the atemporalist’s claim, that a God without complete foreknowledge is not omniscient is equally unfounded, as this requires God to know things that are not so. The main issue in this area is whether a timeless existence is preferable to a temporal one; in my judgement, it is not. It seems that a timeless God is what Padgett terms, “God in a box”.[40] The static theory of time, which is necessary for timelessness, is also incoherent in my view. The doctrine of immutability does not really suffer from this providing it is sensibly interpreted as pertaining to God’s character rather than in absolute terms. Finally, if time is seen as a feature of God’s being then the idea of time having no beginning is no more a problem than the idea of God having no beginning.
At the heart of this discussion is a trade-off between God’s personality and the extent of his attributes. If one is persuaded that God has complete foreknowledge and that he is absolutely immutable, then one’s decision will almost certainly be that God is outside of time. However, if one is attached to the idea that God has personality then one will likely conclude that he is inside time, this is where my bias lies.
[1] Jethro (1995).
[2] Ganssle (2001) p.12.
[3] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p31.
[4] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) pp188-189.
[5] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp 214-215.
[6] Craig, in Ganssle (2001) p 131. (2 Timothy 1:9, Titus 1:2-3, Jude 25)
[7] Ibid.
[8] Proverbs 8:23 in the NIV.
[9] Cranfield C. E. B. (1975) p 25.
[10] Ibid. See also Sanders, (1977) pp552-556.
[11] In his article God Is Everlasting in Peterson et al (1996) pp126-127. Wolterstorff argues this point in agreement with William Kneale but has since changed his mind on the matter.
[12] For example God appears to change his mind in response to Hezekiah’s prayer. 2 Kings 20:1-11.
[13] Boethius, in Peterson et al (1996) p 122.
[14] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p30.
[15] Boethius, cited by Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p36.
[16] Grace Jantzen, cited in Davies (1993) p144.
[17] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p37-38.
[18] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp61-62.
[19] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) p73.
[20] Brian Davies discusses whether God should be seen as an acting person or not and concludes that such vocabulary is anthropomorphic and unbiblical. Davies (1993) pp143-145. However, Genesis tells us that God made humans in his own image, how exactly is this true if God does not have the quality of personhood?
[21] Ganssle (2001) p15.
[22] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp102-104.
[23] Kenny (1979) pp38-39.
[24] Wolterstorff’s argument that time and space are not so alike as it is often claimed because space has no parallel to the process theory of time seems to have some force. Wolterstorff, in Ganssle pp208-209.
[25] Ganssle, (2001) p17.
[26] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp168-169.
[27] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp163-164.
[28] Ibid
[29] Ganssle, (2001) pp17-18.
[30] Peterson, et al. (1998) pp92-95.
[31] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) pp108-110.
[32] Isaac Newton, The Principia, cited by Craig, in Ganssle (2001) pp115-116.
[33] Peterson et al, (1998) pp71-72.
[34] Wolterstorff, in Ganssle (2001) pp191-193.
[35] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p214.
[36] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) p62.
[37] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) pp41-42.
[38] Helm, in Ganssle (2001) p41.
[39] Craig, in Beilby & Eddy, (2001) pp132-135.
[40] Padgett, in Ganssle (2001) p61.
Bibliography
Beilby, J. K. & Eddy, P.R., Divine Foreknowledge, Four views, (2001) Paternoster Press, Carlisle.
Cranfield C. E. B., The International Critical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Vol 1, (1975) T.&T. Clark, Edinburgh.
Davies, B., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (Second edition), (1993) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ganssle, G. E., (ed), God & Time, Four Views, (2001) IVP, Downers Grove, Illinois.
Jethro., The Jethro Junction, (1995) First Independent Films Limited, England.
Kenny, A., The God of the Philosophers, (1979) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lewis, C. S., Mere Christianity, (1952) Fontana Books, London.
Morris, T. V., Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology, (1991) IVP, Downers Grove, Illinois.
Peterson, M., et al, Philosophy of Religion, Selected Readings, (1996) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Peterson, M., et al, Reason and Religious Belief, Second edition, (1998) Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sanders, E. P., Paul and Palestinian Judaism, (1977) SCM Press, London.
posted by Rowland @ Monday, July 25, 2005
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